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INTRODUCTION

September 1, 2005 marked a changing of the guard with respect to
the regulation of lawyer conduct in the State of Nebraska. Upon the
Nebraska Supreme Court's adoption of the Nebraska Rules of Professional Conduct ("Nebraska Rules") through its ruling on In re Petition
of the Nebraska State Bar Association to Adopt Rules of Professional
Conduct Governing Attorneys,1 the state shed its distinct position as
one of only six jurisdictions not yet utilizing some form of the ABA
Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct.2 The new system represents the
first complete revision of the professional ethical standards to which
Nebraska lawyers are held accountable since the adoption of the Code
1.

No. S-36-040001 (Neb. June 8, 2005). The initiative regarding adoption of the
Rules of Professional Conduct originally came before the court upon petition by
the Nebraska State Bar Association on February 17, 2004. The court's formal
adoption occurred June 8, 2005, with the effective date for the implementation of
the new system being set for September 1, 2005. Id.
2. Only New York, Ohio, and Oregon still utilize the former Code of Professional
Responsibility format subsequent to Nebraska's adoption of the new Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, while California and Maine have developed their own
unique rules. STEPHEN GILLERS & Roy D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 3 (2005). Iowa was going through the adoption process at
the same time as Nebraska, and formally adopted the Rules of ProfessionalConduct on July 1, 2005. See IOWA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2005). The methodology of the Model Rules adoption differs from state to state, and no two
jurisdictions have implemented identical versions of the new rules. Louise L.
Hill, Electronic Communications and the 2002 Revisions to the Model Rules, 16
ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 529, 531 (2002).
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of ProfessionalResponsibility ("Nebraska Code"), and embodies a few
key departures from the former standards in both substance and
structure. 3 While it took the Nebraska Supreme Court more than sixteen months of open consideration and analysis to formulate and formally adopt the new rules once the initiative was raised by the
Nebraska State Bar Association, their impact upon practicing lawyers
within the state will be immediate and substantial with respect to
4
many of the new provisions.
Lawyers familiar with the Nebraska Code will recognize many of
the substantive provisions of the former system, which have been carried forward to the Nebraska Rules relatively untouched. 5 There are,
however, substantive and structural changes reflected in the new
rules which will require the attention of those practicing within this
jurisdiction in order to maintain continued compliance with the ethical considerations inherent in the practice of law. What follows is a
topical analysis of some of the key substantive changes reflected in the
new rules, as well as an introduction to the organizational structure
utilized in the new system.
The new rules depart structurally from the former code by abandoning the canon model, under which the rules themselves were accompanied by guiding canons briefly summarizing the overriding
principals with regard to a particular ethical responsibility. 6 These
canons were further clarified through a series of ethical considerations, which laid out the duties, responsibilities, and liabilities associ3. The Code of ProfessionalResponsibility has enjoyed a particularly long tenure in
Nebraska, having governed the state's ethical regulation since its adoption in
1969. Brian C. Buescher, Note, Out with the Code and in with the Rules: The
DisastrousNebraska "Bright Line" Rule for Conflict of Interest: A Direct Consequence of the Shortcomings in the Model Code, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 717, 718
(1999).
4. The Nebraska Supreme Court's adoption of the new system came only after
lengthy debate and comment from the groups who were to be impacted by the
new regulations. Subsequent to the Nebraska State Bar Association's initial petition in February 2004, the Supreme Court published the proposed rules in their
progressive incarnations for comment in April 2004, January 2005, and again in
March 2005, before finally adopting the current version of the rules upon the
expiration of the third comment period. In re Petitionof the Nebraska State Bar
Association, No. S-36-040001 (Neb. June 8, 2005).
5. The substantive changes of the new system are relatively minor as compared to
the substantial structural revisions which have taken place. "The difference between the two codes is not so much in the underlying principles on which they are
based as the formats used to set forth those principles." Mark Hansen, Hot Off
the Press: Revised Model Ethics Rules Are Nearly Ready for State Scrutiny, 88
A.B.A. J., June 2002, at 36, 41.
6. GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 2. These canons were intended to serve as generalized statements of the standards of professional conduct to which lawyers were
to be held accountable. Gregory C. Sisk, Iowa's Legal Ethics Rules-It's Time to
Join the Crowd, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 279, 284 (1999).
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ated with the principals falling within the coverage of the canon. 7
Finally, the specific rules were set forth, providing the legal framework which was essentially an embodiment of the ideals contained in
the cannons and ethical considerations.8
In contrast, the Nebraska Rules mirror the structure of the ABA
Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct, and more importantly, they utilize a restatement format which will be nearly universally familiar to
those in the legal profession. Under this system, the rules are framed
within eight different articles, each of which governs a different ethical duty. 9 This format results in a much more user-friendly interface
in terms of accessibility and cohesion once an initial familiarity is
gained with regard to the location of the rules within the ethical
framework.lO Commentators also cite the advantages which accompany conformity with a nearly universally accepted method of ethical
regulation as necessitating adoption of the Model Rules format, both
from an educational"l and substantive context.12
As will be evidenced in the forthcoming analysis, the structural
framework of the new rules represents a divergence from the Nebraska Code not only with respect to the usability and interface of the
system in its totality, but with respect to the individual provisions and
the extent to which the invocation of one rule will trigger corresponding duties and ethical considerations through the interwoven framework of the new system. This accumulation of duties resulting from
the cross referencing of different articles and specific provisions in the
7. The Ethical Considerationswere aspirational in nature, and set forth the ethical
ideals to which the lawyer should aspire. Sisk, supra note 6. This aspirational
component was abandoned by the drafters of the Model Rules, who instead opted
for a statement of the black letter rules philosophy. Nathan M. Crystal, The Incompleteness of the Model Rules and the Development of Professional Standards,
52 MERCER L. REV. 839, 841 (2001).
8. These disciplinary rules constituted the actual black letter regulations of the
code, and proscribed minimum standards of conduct with regard to each area of
ethical consideration, below which the lawyer would be subject to sanction. Sisk,
supra note 6, at 284.
9. Crystal, supra note 7, at 843.
10. The clarity and precision of the Model Rules format was one of the primary considerations in favor of a departure from the former system. Susan Poser, Foreword, Nebraska and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 81 NEB. L. REV.
1315, 1316 (2003).
11. Stephen E. Kalish, To Provide a Common Conceptual and Linguistic Vocabulary
in Order to FosterEthics Dialogue and Education: The Nebraska Supreme Court
Should Adopt the Revised Model Rules-The "Bright Line" Rule Example, 81
NEB. L. REV. 1351, 1352-53 (2003).
12. Given that the Model Rules are utilized in the vast majority of United States
jurisdictions, they enjoy significant advantages in terms of their level of refinement and modem day applicability. As the principle system of regulation, the
Model Rules are more evolutionary in nature, and better able to adapt to the
changing face of ethical considerations facing the legal system. See Sisk, supra
note 6, at 283.
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new rules can create a veritable minefield for the unwitting lawyer
who is unfamiliar with the new structure, as the violation of one specific duty may give rise to a number of satellite violations. 13 Thus, the
structural divergence of the new rules from the Nebraska Code is of
paramount importance, as the comparatively intricate framework will
have an impact on the manner in which the ethical considerations contained therein are interpreted and applied.
Another central theme that arises throughout the new rules is a
tendency towards a protective mentality with regard to the rights and
interests of the client.1 4 This is frequently accomplished via semantic
departures from the former canon system which used prohibitions on
forbidden lawyer conduct to affirmative duties owed to the client with
regard to the specific ethical obligation in question. As will be subsequently illustrated, the effects of such a shift can be quite onerous
upon the lawyer, and may dramatically alter the light in which the
lawyer's conduct is viewed in disciplinary matters. In many of the
new provisions, this phenomenon may also be characterized as an attempt to allocate the burden of protecting the legal interests which
may be at stake should a particular course of conduct be pursued, or of
ensuring compliance with the ethical consideration which has been invoked in a particular situation, upon the party best situated to navigate the complexities of the situation. Under either scenario, the new
provisions tend to be skewed in a manner which at times explicitly,
and at other times subtly, places the duty of protecting the rights, in-

13. An illustration of this phenomenon, which will be a recurring theme throughout
this analysis, can be provided through a brief examination of the provisions relating to communication, informed consent, and current client conflicts of interest.
Under Rule 1.4(a)(1), a lawyer shall promptly inform the client of any circumstances with respect to which the client's informed consent (as per Rule 1.0(e)) is
required. See NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e), 1.4(a)(1) (2005). Assuming a situation in which the lawyer is in violation of a seemingly unrelated provision, such as an infraction involving the acceptance of compensation for the
representation from one other than the client without first acquiring the client's
informed consent as required by Rule 1.8(f)(1), the lawyer will likewise find himself or herself in violation of the Rule 1.4 communication requirement, due to the
fact that Rule 1.4(a)(1) renders the rule applicable to all other provisions within
the Model Rules in which the informed consent requirement is triggered. See id.
at R. 1.4, 1.8(f)(1). Perhaps an even more direct example is Rule 8.4, which
makes a violation elsewhere in the rules a separate and distinct violation of this
misconduct rule; thus, this rule is automatically triggered in addition to all other
applicable violations of the Nebraska Rules. See id. at R. 8.4.
14. The Model Rules can, in part, be characterized as an attempt "to clarify and
strengthen a lawyer's duty to communicate with the client and a lawyer's duty to
clients in specific problem areas." James D. Gallagher & Cara M. Kearney, Note,
Representing a Client With Diminished Capacity: Where the Law Stands and
Where It Needs to Go, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 597, 599 (2003).
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terests, and objectives of the client squarely upon the shoulders of the

lawyer. 15
II.
A.

NEBRASKA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Preamble

The concept of a gradual digression from broad based ethical considerations and principals to the specific rules designed to govern the
ethical responsibilities of the legal profession has not been abandoned
altogether. The Nebraska Rules contain a preamble which sets forth
"A Lawyer's Responsibilities."16 The broad principles set forth in the
Preamble carry forward many of the same concepts as the canons and
ethical considerations, and similarly provide a type of framework for
the system by identifying the ideals sought to be protected and enforced by the rules themselves.17
B.

Scope

Following the Preamble, the Scope section briefly outlines some of
the key principles with respect to the interpretation and application of
the new rules. This should be the first step of inquiry for the lawyer
faced with uncertainty regarding how she should resolve a particular
ethical dilemma under the new rules, or for guidance as to the intended purpose of the new provisions. Although the Scope section is
primarily restricted to broad based principles of construction and interpretation, it does specifically address the intended relationship between the rules and any potential liability to the client which may
arise through the violation of a specific provision. While such a violation does not create an independent cause of action, it may be used as
evidence in a malpractice case to establish the breach of an applicable
standard of conduct.18
C.

Terminology

Located immediately before the actual substantive rules is a terminology section, which sets forth key definitions and interpretations
15. Commentary suggests that the Model Rules seek to place professionals as guardians of the integrity of the legal profession, and preserve its image in the public
eye-a goal which could not be accomplished absent the client-based concerns
outlined herein. See Julie L. Hussey, Reporting Another Attorney for Violating
the Rules of ProfessionalConduct: The Current Status of the Law in the States
Which Have Adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 23 J. LEGAL PROF.
265, 265 (1999).
16. NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities (2005).
17. Absent this brief introductory section, the new rules provide little in the way of
aspirational guidance. See Sisk, supra note 6, at 284.
18. NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope § 20 (2005).
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necessary for proper application and understanding of subsequent
rules.1 9 This form represents a significant change from the Nebraska
Code, which did not contain a dedicated definitional section. The terminology section does not serve as an all-encompassing glossary of all
the standards and methodology set forth within the rules. Rather, it
provides an efficient means of defining some of the key concepts which
emerge frequently within the body of rules. 20 For example, the specific elements constituting informed consent 2 ' and screening, 2 2 both of
which arise with respect to numerous provisions in the new rules, may
be ascertained within the terminology section, with the definitions of
those terms being uniformly applied throughout the rules. Providing
a fixed, universal definition of a concept which is embodied within a
number of different ethical rules gives the new rules some degree of
standardization which may prove to eliminate many of the ambiguities regarding how the rules are to be interpreted and applied. This
approach represents a significant divergence from the Nebraska Code,
as is necessitated by the form of the new rules, which utilize a much
more systematic black-letter approach to working through the intricacies of legal ethics. This stands in stark contrast to the broad-sweeping methodology of the Nebraska Code, which often required
resolution of very narrow ethical considerations by application of a few
23
generalized guiding principals.
D.

Article 1-Client-Lawyer Relationship
1.

Competence

The first black-letter rule within the Nebraska Rules, Rule 1.1, sets
forth a general duty of competence in the representation of the client.
The concept of competent representation is further defined as requiring "the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, preparation and judgment reasonably necessary for the representation." 2 4 The idea of a
duty of competence was similarly present in the Nebraska Code,
though with a few variations. The former version, located at Disciplinary Rule 6-101, was phrased as a prohibition against acting in violation of the duty of competence (the lawyer shall not), as opposed to the
19. Id. at R. 1.0.
20. Despite the limits of the terminology section, any vagueness or interpretive dilemmas stemming from uncertainty regarding standards or definitions under the
Model Rules is not likely to go unresolved, as the ABA's Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility regularly issues opinions offering guidance on the
meaning and application of the rules. Sisk, supra note 6, at 289.
21. NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) (2005).
22. Id. at R. 1.0(k).
23. See Poser, supra note 10, at 1316.
24. NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2005).
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Model Rules phrasing in terms of an affirmative duty (the lawyer
25
shall).
With regard to the elements of competence in the representation of
the client, the Nebraska Code seemed to maintain a slightly narrower
focus as compared to the Nebraska Rules. The disciplinary rule explicitly required only that the lawyer not handle a legal matter she knows
she is not competent to handle, not handle a legal matter without adequate preparation, and not neglect a legal matter entrusted to her. It
would seem that the competence requirement in the Nebraska Rules,
which is further defined to include the full litany of characteristics
necessary for competent legal representation, encompasses more than
just the adequate legal knowledge, preparation, and diligence explicitly required by the Nebraska Code.2 6 Rule 1.1 takes a more expansive view of what competent representation requires. By including
the term "judgment" in the list of requirements for competent representation, there is some indication that possessing the requisite legal
skills and devoting the necessary time and attention to the matter
may not suffice if, for example, the lawyer made decisions during the
course of the representation which may later be perceived as imprudent under the circumstances.
Although the new standards with regard to competence in the representation of a client will not require any drastic modifications to the
lawyer's behavior in order to maintain compliance, the phrasing and
structure of the provision invites further inquiry into its significance
from the vantage point of both lawyer and client. By stating the competence requirement as an affirmative duty owed to the client, as opposed to a prohibition against activities contrary to the competence
requirement, the new rules seem to be adopting a more client-oriented
approach. The affirmative duty phrasing commonly utilized in the
ABA Model Rules, and as incorporated in the new Nebraska Rules,
places a more onerous duty upon the lawyer, at least from a theoretical standpoint. 27 As a practical matter, a duty of competence will not
25. NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101 (2000).
26. The comments to Rule 1.1 do offer some degree of explanatory insight, at least
with regard to the knowledge and skill elements, stating that the relevant factors
to be considered include:
[T]he relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer's general experience, the lawyer's training and experience in the
field in question, the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the
matter, and whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or
consult with, a lawyer of established competence in the field in question.
NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 1 (2005).
27. While certainly significantly more demanding as compared to the former system,
Nebraska's version of the Model Rules does not advance the lawyer's level of responsibility, to either clients or third parties, to the extremes it has been carried
in some states. Compare, for example, New Jersey's version of the confidentiality
exceptions, N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2004), which requires a law-
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differ significantly from a duty not to act in violation of a competence
requirement, but in examining the difference as a shift in the theoretical underpinnings of the rules as a whole, the implications could have
a greater impact. 28 Analyzing the inquiry in a different context, the
duty to save another individual is a far more demanding standard
than a duty not to harm, and while the subsequent definitional clarification of the ethical considerations provided for in the NebraskaRules
will prevent such a disparity with regard to the ethical obligations of a
lawyer, having an affirmative duty structure as a starting point may
prove significant with regard to the courts' interpretation and application of the new rules in disciplinary actions.
2.

Scope of the Representation

Rule 1.2 of the Nebraska Rules deals with the "Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between [the] Client and [the] Lawyer." 29 The primary requirements of this rule are that the lawyer
abide by the client's decisions concerning the objectives of the representation, and that the lawyer not counsel the client to engage in, or
assist a client in, conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.30 The rule also grants the lawyer the ability to limit the scope of
her representation, as long as the client first gives informed consent to
3
the restriction. 1
The Nebraska Code, through a variety of different provisions, accomplished fairly similar regulatory coverage. Disciplinary Rule 710 1(A)(1) of the Nebraska Code required that the lawyer not intentionally fail to seek the lawful objectives of her client through reasonably
available means permitted by law and the DisciplinaryRules, which is
similar to the concept behind the new Rule 1.2(a) that the client
should set forth the objectives of the representation, to which the lawyer must subsequently adhere.32 Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(6)-(8)
mirrors Model Rule 1.2(c) in its prohibitions against aiding the client
in the pursuit of a course of conduct the lawyer knows to be illegal. 33
yer to reveal confidential information to the proper authorities in the stated confidentiality exceptions, with the Nebraska version, NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R 1.6(b) (2005), which provides that a lawyer may reveal such information.
28. This change is largely a result of the frequent use of discretion-based standards
throughout the new rules. The use of such standards as "may," as opposed to
'shall," reflects the fact that not all of the rules are designed with a direct disciplinary purpose in mind. Instead, some rules seek to fix the applicable level of
discretion for the subject ethical consideration. See Crystal, supra note 7, at 842.
29.

NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2005).

30. Id. at R. 1.2(a), (b).
31. Id. at R. 1.2(d).
32.

NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(a)(1) (2000).

33. Id. at DR 7-102(A)(6)-(8). In addition, the DisciplinaryRules allow for permissive withdrawal from representation in such instances. See id. at DR 2ll0(c)(1)(c).
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One difference which lawyers should take note of is the requirement in the Nebraska Rules involving informed consent by the client
prior to attempting to limit the scope of the representation. 34 This
requirement, which is required in the new rules as a necessary precursor to numerous courses of action a lawyer may take with regard to
the representation, further evidences an intent in the new rules to afford greater protection to the client and the pursuit of the client's
objectives. From a client's perspective, such disclosure requirements
are welcome safeguards, especially to those clients who have become
immersed in a legal relationship and new environment with which
they are unfamiliar, and under which their uninformed acquiescence
in their lawyer's attempt to limit the scope of representation could
have significant consequences with respect to their objectives in seeking legal counsel. For lawyers, these requirements represent procedural hurdles which must be identified and complied with prior to
engaging in a variety of courses of action which they may have previously pursued without formal documentation or disclosure, in order to
avoid the potential for future disciplinary sanctions. 35
3. Diligence
The requirement of diligence in the course of representation is set
forth in Nebraska Rule 1.3, which mandates the use of reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.36 This requirement
was similarly embodied in the former Nebraska Code by way of a combination of Disciplinary Rules 6-101(A)(3)37 and 7-101(A)(1).38
Disciplinary Rule 6-101(A)(3) stated that a lawyer shall not neglect
a legal matter entrusted to him or her, and the clause in Disciplinary
Rule 7-101(A)(1) which required punctuality in fulfilling all professional commitments, effectively encompassed the full gamut of the diligence requirements set forth in Nebraska Rule 1.3.
34. Informed consent requires the client's acquiescence in the proposed course of action after the lawyer has provided the client with adequate information regarding
the material risks of such conduct, and the reasonably available alternatives. See
NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) (2005).
35. The comments to Rule 1.0 further outline the duties imposed upon the lawyer
through the mandate of informed consent. The level of communication required
will vary depending on the relevant circumstances and the ethical duty in question, but will ordinarily mandate communication to the client of the circumstances giving rise to the informed consent requirement, and such explanation as
is necessary to permit the client to make an informed decision regarding the consent. Id. at R. 1.0 cmt. 6.
36. Id. at R. 1.3.
37. NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A)(3) (2000) (stating that the lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him or her).
38. Id. at DR 7-101(A)(1) (requiring punctuality in the fulfillment of all professional
commitments).

1320
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Communication

The new provisions governing communication, which are located at
Rule 1.4, represent one of the first major expansions of the ethical regulations contained in the Nebraska Code.3 9 Rule 1.4 contains six different regulations imposing duties on the lawyer concerning client
communications: to inform the client of any decisions or circumstances
which would require their informed consent; to consult with the client
about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished; to keep the client reasonably informed regarding the status of
the matter; to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; to consult with the client regarding any limitations on the lawyer's conduct necessitated by the Nebraska Rules of Professional
Conduct or other law; and to explain matters to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding
40
the representation.
In contrast to the broad coverage the Nebraska Rules allot to the
area of communication, the Nebraska Code was surprisingly abrupt on
the issue. There was little black letter regulatory support for the issue
of communication, which was primarily dealt with under the Disciplinary Rule 6-101(A)(3) admonishment that a lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him or her.41
The majority of those provisions found in Nebraska Rule 1.4 would
seem to fit within the prohibitions against neglecting a legal matter as
found in Disciplinary Rule 6-101(A)(3) through a broad interpretation
of what constitutes neglect, yet there are some differences which result primarily from the structure of the new rules and the corresponding interplay between various provisions in the new system. The
communication requirements set forth herein are rendered applicable
to each and every situation throughout the rules which is accompanied by an informed consent requirement. The ramifications of this
are a potential triggering of satellite violations when there is a shortcoming with respect to a single ethical duty; if the lawyer is in violation of a particular rule based on a failure to meet an informed consent
requirement, the lawyer will almost certainly be in violation of Rule
1.4(a)(1) as well, for failure to communicate to the client a situation
requiring the client's informed consent.4 2

39. NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2005).
40. Id, at R. 1.4(a), (b). Rule 1.4(a)(1) is of potential relevance with respect to all
other provisions within the Nebraska Rules in which there is an informed consent
requirement. See supra note 13.
41.

NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A)(3) (2000).

42. See supra note 13.
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5. Fees
The ethical considerations regarding legal fees are set forth in Nebraska Rule 1.5.43 The primary focus from Nebraska Code Disciplinary Rule 2-106(A) and (B), that a lawyer shall not charge a fee which
is clearly excessive based on a number of criteria relevant to the nature and scope of the representation, is carried forward to the new
rules relatively untouched. 44 There are, however, some important differences relating to fee disclosure which were not covered in the former disciplinary rules.
Rule 1.5(b) requires the lawyer to disclose to the client the basis or
rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible,
preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation. 45 There is an exception to this requirement in situations involving a regularly represented client, though
any changes to the regular representation costs must be communicated to the client as per the previously mentioned requirement.46 By
not mandating that the disclosure be in writing and prior to the representation, the new rule stops short of dramatically altering the manner in which lawyers are required to handle their fee arrangements
with new or prospective clients, and avoids the difficult situations
which may have emerged if clients were required to parse though
in what may be a
dense fee disclosures before securing representation
47
very traumatic and time-sensitive situation.
The disclosure requirements in the NebraskaRules are more stringent with regard to contingent fee arrangements. 48 Rule 1.5(c) re43. NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2005).
44. NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(A), (B) (2000). The explicit requirement of the new rule, in comparison, is that a lawyer may not charge a fee
that is larger than reasonable. Ankur Parekh & Jay R. Pelkofer, Note, Lawyers,
Ethics, and Fees: Getting Paid Under Model Rule 1.5, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics
767, 769 (2003).
45. NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(b) (2005). The primary motivation in requiring the lawyer to be upfront and forthright with regard to fee arrangements
is to avoid the fee-related disputes which result from misunderstandings relating
to the basis, nature, and extent of the fees charged for legal services. See Parekh
& Pelkofer, supra note 44, at 771.
46. NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(b) (2005).
47. Until recently, Model Rule 1.5(b) required the basis and rate of a lawyer's fee to
be communicated to the client in writing before the lawyer rendered substantial
services in the matter; it was not until the 2002 amendments to the Model Rules
that a shift was seen to the more forgiving embodiment adopted in Nebraska,
which permits such communication to occur within a reasonable time after the
representation has commenced.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

1.5(b)

(2002).
48. The higher level of scrutiny the Nebraska Rules of Professional Conduct place
upon contingent fee arrangements mirrors the presumption long reflected in the
Model Rules, that contingent fees are more susceptible to abusive practices than
are other fee arrangements. See Parekh & Pelkofer, supra note 44, at 773-74.
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quires that such arrangements be in writing signed by the client and
clearly state the method by which the fee shall be calculated. 4 9 Furthermore, there is a post-representation reconciliation process which
must be provided for the client, consisting of a written statement
showing whether a fee is owed as a result of the contingent representation, and the calculation method utilized in arriving at the total remittance amount. 50 Although the Nebraska Code did include whether
or not the fee was a contingent arrangement in the list of criteria it
utilized to determine whether a fee was reasonable, it did not contain
an explicit black letter rule setting forth the comparatively rigid procedural requirements of Rule 1.5(d).51
In many ways, the manner in which the Nebraska Rules provide
for a uniform procedural system of regulation with regard to both contingent and non-contingent fee arrangements will represent a welcome change from the broad-based reasonableness test set forth in the
Nebraska Code. Disputes regarding fee arrangements are a prevalent
source of contention between lawyers and their clients,52 and the lack
of definitive regulatory standards to define what constituted appropriate conduct with regard to these arrangements most likely played a
significant role in perpetuating the problem. The new provisions
should help clarify the state's expectations with respect to the documentation and communication of billing practices. This is not to say,
however, that disputes will no longer boil down to interpretation of the
slippery reasonableness standard; the requirement that the fee be reasonable given the circumstances of the representation remains the
core tenant of the new Nebraska Rules regarding legal fees. 53 The expansion of the provisions in this area merely establish foundational
procedural requirements, which should aid in the avoidance of some
conflicts involving fee arrangements which may have been reasonable
under the circumstances, but did not correlate with the client's understanding of what she was being held financially accountable for.
49. NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(c) (2005).
50. Id. Commentary suggests that the prudent lawyer will require the client to sign
off on the post-representation reconciliation prior to disbursing any checks from
the proceeds of the claim, though this is not explicitly provided for in the rules.
Parekh & Pelkofer, supra note 44, at 774.
51. Some states have further developed the reasonableness requirement with regard
to contingent fee arrangements to incorporate a system of presumptions. Michigan, for example, has a provision which sets a maximum allowable fee of onethird of the amount recovered in personal injury or wrongful death claims; in the
event a lawyer receives a contingent fee in excess of this limit, they are deemed to
have violated the rule's prohibition against charging a fee which is clearly excessive. MICH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.121 (2002).
52. See SUSAN R. MARTYN & LAWRENCE J. Fox, TRAVERSING THE ETHICAL MINEFIELD:
PROBLEMS, LAW, AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 367 (2004).
53.

NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

1.5(a) (2005).
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While facially beneficial to the client, these new provisions are
probably better viewed in light of an objective to avoid misunderstandings and disputes with regard to legal fees, as opposed to protectionist
measures in favor of the client. Although the disclosure and documentation requirements in particular could reduce some billing malfeasance, or at least allow the client to gain prompt knowledge and
documented evidence of such, the motivation for the expansion in this
area is likely aimed at reducing fee-related disputes to the benefit of
both parties. 5 4 By requiring full disclosure of the basis for the fee at
the commencement of the representation, and full documentation of
the fee calculation at the conclusion of the matter, at least some of the
potential sources of contention giving rise to fee-based disputes will be
removed from the transaction.
6.

Confidentiality

Nebraska Rule 1.6 embodies some changes to the ethical rules governing confidentiality which will substantially impact Nebraska lawyers. 5 5 The expansion of the communications protected by the
confidentiality rules represents one of the more significant revisions
from the corresponding provisions of the Nebraska Code. The changes
are not, however, all addressed at expanding confidentiality protections. Although the rules stopped short of creating new mandatory
disclosure situations, 5 6 there are provisions granting Nebraska lawyers greater latitude with regard to permissive disclosure in particular situations. 5 7
The most striking difference with respect to confidentiality between the old Nebraska Code and the new Nebraska Rules is in the
definitional standard of the confidential communication itself. Disciplinary Rule 4-101(A) of the Nebraska Code utilized the term "confidence" as referring to information protected by the lawyer-client
privilege under applicable law, as well as the term "secret," as refer54. The writing requirements are not expected to place any significant burden upon
the lawyer, as little more than a simple memorandum reflecting the lawyers billing practices will be required in most situations; their primary function is to reduce the possibility of fee-related misunderstandings. See Parekh & Pelkofer,
supra note 44, at 772.
55. NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2005).

56. See supra note 27 (discussing the New Jersey regulation which actually goes so
far as to mandate disclosure under the confidentiality exceptions, as opposed to
the permissive language utilized in the Nebraska Rules).
57. Commentary suggests that changes to the confidentiality exceptions, no matter
how dramatic their ramifications may be perceived, will not have an immediate
impact on the behavior of lawyers with regard to this duty, as such considerations are often driven by an innate conception of right and wrong, as opposed to
concern for regulation-imposed ethical duties. See David Lew, Revised Model
Rule 1.6: What Effect Will the New Rule Have on PracticingAttorneys?, 18 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 881, 884-85 (2005).
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ring to information gained in the professional relationship which the
client has asked, or reasonably would expect, not to be disclosed.58 In
contrast, the new rules concerning confidential communications operate under a much broader view of what constitutes protected communication. Nebraska Rule 1.6(a) sets forth the standard of protected
communication as being all information relating to the representation
of the client.59 The ramifications of this alteration are quite significant, as the concept of confidential communications has been expanded far beyond that of the lawyer-client privilege, or "secrets" of
which disclosure to outside parties would be against the client's interest. A great deal of client communication which would fall outside
that privilege or the additional "secret" information standard, of which
the lawyer formerly had some discretion to divulge irrespective of the
client's consent, will be ensnared by the broad new "relating to the
representation of a client" standard.
The revisions to the confidentiality rules are not restricted to the
definitional expansion of what constitutes protected communication.
The provisions governing when a lawyer may or may not reveal these
confidential communications have also been modified. Disciplinary
Rule 4-101(B) stated that a lawyer may not knowingly reveal a confidence or secret of the client, use such confidence or secrets to the client's disadvantage, or use the same to her own advantage unless full
disclosure is provided.60 Nebraska Rule 1.6(a) is much more abrupt,
mandating that the lawyer abstain from revealing information relating to the representation unless the client provides informed consent,
or is impliedly authorized to do so in order to carry out the representation.6 1 Each regulatory system then sets forth a corresponding set of
circumstances in which disclosure of the confidential communication
is permissible. Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C) of the Nebraska Code permitted a lawyer to reveal that communication which the client had
consented to after full disclosure (therefore creating a scenario similar
to that of informed consent prior to disclosure as set forth in the Nebraska Rules).6 2 In addition, the lawyer was able to reveal confidential communication when such revelation was permitted under the
Nebraska Code or required by law or court order, when the communication regarded the intention of the client to commit a crime and such
information as may be necessary to prevent said crime, and such communication as may be necessary to establish the lawyer's defense
3
against an accusation of wrongful conduct.6
58. NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A) (2000).
59. NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2005).
60. NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B) (2000).

61. NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2005).
62. NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C) (2000).
63. Id. at DR 4-101(C).
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There are two significant areas where the new rules regarding revelations of confidential communications diverge from the code. The
crime prevention exception in the Nebraska Rules permits the lawyer
to disclose confidential information as necessary to prevent the client
from committing a crime, and as necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm at the hands of either client or
third party alike. 64 The addition of the reasonably certain death or
substantial bodily harm requirement gives the lawyer some latitude
to reveal information in situations where doing so would previously
have been prohibited, where the acts in question would not rise to the
level of a crime. The second addition to the confidentiality exceptions
is permissive disclosure in situations where the lawyer is securing legal advice regarding compliance with the ethical rules.65 It should be
noted that the Nebraska Rules stopped short of the approach adopted
by some jurisdictions, which mandates disclosure in situations involving communication relating to the perpetration of a crime, or as necessary to prevent substantial death or bodily harm.66 In addition,
Nebraska declined to adopt the so called "Enron" exceptions 6 7 of the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which permit disclosure in
order to prevent substantial financial harm to a third party in situations where the lawyer's services have been utilized. 68 In refusing to
acquiesce in the trend towards mandatory disclosure in certain circumstances, the Nebraska Rules avoid possible negative ramifications
resulting from a degradation of the concept of the confidentiality of
client communications. 6 9 It would seem that by allowing this long
standing duty to be carved out with numerous protective devices for
64.
65.
66.
67.

NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2005).

Id. at R. 1.6(b)(2).
See supra note 27.
The theory underlying these exceptions was that the consequences of the Enron
debacle could have been mitigated had the lawyers involved been capable of disclosing information relating to the fraudulence while it was still in progress.
Kristy Brewer, Note, Tax Shelter Information and How the Confidentiality Rule
Protects Clients: The Relevance of Recent Changes to ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6, 13 U. MiLi Bus. L. REv. 31, 37 (2004).
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2), (3) (2003). These additions, which
were added to the ABA Model Rules as part of the 2003 Amendments, were recognized as a potential source of controversy prior to Nebraska's adoption of the
Model Rules. See Poser, supra note 10, at 1316. While Nebraska is not alone in
their refusal to explicitly place the protection of financial interests paramount to
the concept of confidential communication, some states have gone even further in
the other direction; the New Jersey rule, for example, carries forward the same
mandatory disclosure requirement to include communication necessary to protect
the financial interests of another. N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1)
(2004).
69. Commentators suggest that strong confidentiality protection is necessary to
maintain trust between the client and the lawyer; conversely, those in favor of
breaking down the walls of confidentiality protection feel that doing so will foster
an improved image of the legal profession in the public eye. Amanda Vance &
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the benefit of third parties, the client-lawyer relationship, especially
with regard to criminal representation, would be detrimentally
70
affected.
These new provisions governing confidential communications
strike some semblance of a balance between the interest of both client
and lawyer. The new "relating to the representation standard" affords
a client considerably more protection regarding her rights to confidentiality. While this is a formidable right which has significantly increased the safeguards in place to secure confidentiality for the client
with regard to the representation, these concessions are mitigated to
some degree by the expansion of the confidentiality exceptions for permissive disclosure.71
7.

Conflicts of Interest

Concurrent conflicts of interest are dealt with in Nebraska Rules
1.7 and 1.8, which set forth the duties owed and proper courses of action in situations where conflicts exist. The handling of current client
conflicts is fairly similar across both the previous and the new regulatory systems. Disciplinary Rule 5-101(A) of the Nebraska Code required withdrawal when the interests of the lawyer would impair her
professional judgment, and in situations involving conflicting interests resulting from the representation of adverse interests. 7 2 The former rules permitted the representation of potentially adverse or
impaired interests upon consent after full disclosure by the clients, or
upon consent by all clients after full disclosure of the risks of multiple
representation in situations involving potentially adverse interests.73
Rule 1.7 of the Nebraska Rules permits the representation of a client

70.

71.

72.
73.

Randi Wallach, Note, Updating Confidentiality: An Overview of the Recent
Changes to Model Rule 1.6, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1003, 1010 (2004).
One of the primary justifications offered in support of maintaining the concept of
confidential communication, that its preservation promotes efficiency in the legal
system, would logically permit an exception to the confidence only as would be
necessitated in order to restore or promote effective operation of the system of
justice. See MARTYN & Fox, supra note 52, at 152. Nebraska's decision to stop
short of incorporating the full litany of confidentiality exceptions contained in the
Model Rules would indicate that, at least for the time being, Nebraska views the
consequences of a degradation of the confidential communication protection as
outweighing the potential benefits of allowing a lawyer to disclose information as
necessary to prevent harm to the financial interests of another.
Given that the primary purpose of the new exceptions is to bolster the rights of
third parties who may be harmed as a result of the client's malfeasance, the conceptualization of the lawyer's duty to the client may be subject to an important
caveat; such duty does not trump the rights of innocent parties to the matter.
Shannan E. Higgins, Ethical Rules of Lawyering:An Analysis of Role-based Reasoning from Zealous Advocacy to Purposivism, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 639, 661
(1999).
NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(A) (2000).
Id. at DR 5-105(C).
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despite the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest upon receiving
informed consent, confirmed in writing. 74 This confirmed-in-writing
requirement, which is imposed within a number of provisions in the
Nebraska Rules, adds an additional procedural hoop to the traditional
consent and disclosure requirements by requiring formal documentation of the full dissemination of the risks of accepting representation
under such circumstances. 75 The rules governing the lawyer's participation in business transactions with clients contain similarly slight
differences. Disciplinary Rule 5-104(A) of the Nebraska Code permitted such transactions only after consent and disclosure, 7 6 while the
new Nebraska Rules again go a step further, requiring that the lawyer
advise the client in writing of the desirability of retaining independent
counsel to represent the client in the transaction, and acquire informed consent in a writing signed by the client as to the essential
77
terms of the transaction.
Rule 1.8 outlines specific personal interest conflicts, the majority of
which are in keeping with the guidelines found in the Nebraska
Code.78 New to the NebraskaRules is Rule 1.8(j), which forbids a lawyer from having sexual relations with a client unless such a relationship existed before the client-lawyer relationship commenced. 7 9 The
final provision of the rule serves to impute all of the Rule 1.8 conflicts,
with the exception of the new sexual relations provision, to all other
80
lawyers in the firm.
The rules governing conflicts of interest with respect to former clients are located in Nebraska Rule 1.9.81 As was the case with concurrent conflict situations there is a significant difference between the
previous rules governing former client conflicts and the present provisions with regard to the method of disclosure necessary prior to continuance of the representation when such a conflict exists. Under
Disciplinary Rule 5-108 of the Nebraska Code, a lawyer could not represent a client in the same or substantially related matter in which
the current client's interests were materially adverse to those of a former client, nor could a lawyer represent a client in a substantially
related matter in which the lawyer's former firm represented the for74. NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2005).
75. Id. at R. 1.0(b). By coupling the informed consent and confirmed in writing requirements, the rules bestow the highest possible burden upon the lawyer attempting to justify the representation in a situation where a conflict was present;
only a fully documented account reflecting full disclosure will satisfy this
standard.
76. NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-104(A) (2000).
77. NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) (2005).
78. Id. at R. 1.8.
79. Id. at R. 1.8(j).
80. Id. at R. 1.8(k).
81. Id. at R. 1.9.
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2
mer client, unless the former client consented after consultation.8
This pre-representation consent on the part of the former client is
strengthened to some degree with the addition of the dual requirement of informed consent and confirmation in writing by the Nebraska
Rules.83 If, however, the lawyer did not acquire confidential information regarding the client while employed with the first firm, Rule
1.9(b) would permit representation of a client with interests adverse to
those of the first client by the lawyer while employed with the second
firm;8 4 this is a scenario which would not have been permissible under
the Nebraska Code unless the consent of the prior client could was
secured. Under the former system, there was an irrebuttable presumption that the lawyer had acquired confidential information while
employed with the first firm;8 5 this is an unusual position which
served as the basis of a bright-line rule which constituted a "thorn in
the side of Nebraska attorneys and law firms" prior to the shift to the
Model Rules.86 The bright-line conflict policy was originally adopted
in FirsTier Bank v. Buckley,8 7 and though its effects had been mitigated to some degree with regard to support personnel,8 8 it was frequently cited as one of the more powerful arguments in favor of
89
Nebraska's shift to the Model Rules.
In addition to the explicit overruling of the bright-line conflict rule
of the previous system, the Nebraska Rules also adopt a more lenient
approach to the imputation of conflicts with regard to support personnel, allowing representation in situations where the entire firm would
have been conflicted out under the Nebraska Code. According to Nebraska Rule 1.9, support personal may be screened from the matter to
avoid what would otherwise constitute a conflict of interest resulting
from the representation of a client by that support personnel's former
firm. 90 This screening provision was not explicitly set forth in the former Nebraska Code, which permitted the support personnel's new
firm to continue with the representation only if confidential information received by the personnel while associated with the former firm
was not likely to be significant in the current matter. 9 1 The addition
of this screening provision should make it significantly easier for law

DR 5-108 (2000).
1.9(a) (2005).

82.

NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY

83.

NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

84. Id. at R. 1.9(b).
85. W. Bradley Wendel, Conflicts of Interest Under the Revised Model Rules, 81 NEB.
L. REV. 1363, 1375 (2003).
86. Buescher, supra note 3, at 718.
87. 244 Neb. 36, 45, 503 N.W.2d 838, 844 (1993).
88. Buescher, supra note 3, at 731-33; NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5109(C)(2) (2000).
89. Buescher, supra note 3, at 731-33.

R.

90.

NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT

91.

NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY

1.9(e) (2005).

DR 5-109(C)(2) (2000).
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clerks, as well as lawyers who had previously been employed in a
clerking position while in school, to move freely between firms without
risk of having that new firm conflicted out of a potential or existing
representation.
The combination of this screening provision for support personnel
and, more importantly, the alleviation of the bright-line conflict rule
with regard to subsequent representation of a client whose interests
are adverse to those of a client represented by the lawyer's previous
firm, represents one of the few junctures within the new rules in
which the interests of the lawyer have been favored over those of the
client. 92 These rules will greatly facilitate the ability of lawyers, law
clerks, or other support staff members to move freely from firm to firm
in pursuit of new career opportunities by reducing the risk of themselves and their firms being conflicted out of a potential representation. These concessions are clearly in conflict with interests of the
client, as they favor the ability of the lawyer and support personnel to
move freely in search of new employment opportunities at the expense
of the client's interests with regard to conflict situations, representing
a break from the tendencies toward provisions offering increased protection for client interests which permeate the new rules. At least
with regard to the ability of a lawyer to move freely in pursuit of her
career objectives, the Nebraska Supreme Court has indicated, through
the adoption of the rule in the present incarnation, that the interests,
rights, and well-being of the client will not be held paramount to those
of the lawyer across the full spectrum of ethical considerations and
duties regulated under the Nebraska Rules.
8. OrganizationalRepresentation
The NebraskaRules provide a detailed framework of regulation regarding organizational representation which was not directly set forth
in the former Nebraska Code. The guiding principle of these provisions is set forth in Rule 1.13(a), which states that a lawyer employed
or retained by the organization represents the entity itself.9 3 The
rules then proceed to state the means through which a lawyer representing an organization must report indiscretions of corporate personnel relating to the representation which may reasonably be imputed
upon or result in harm to the organization. The rule sets forth an upthe-ladder reporting requirement under which the lawyer must pro92. The interest of the client in this situation would aptly be characterized as "the
former client's interest in assuring that protected information not be used to its
disadvantage," while the conflicting interests of the lawyer would be the "departing lawyer's interest in job mobility." See Kalish, supra note 11, at 1354.
93. NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2005).
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is reasonably necessary
ceed to the organization's highest authority as
94
to protect the interests of the organization.
9.

Clients with Diminished Capacity

The next area of the Nebraska Rules relating to client communications which diverges from the provisions found in the Nebraska Code
is Rule 1.14, which identifies the ethical considerations involved in
representing a client with diminished capacity. 9 5 The rule requires
that the lawyer first attempt to maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship, though it permits the lawyer to take protective action for the
client, including consultation with individuals or entities capable of
protecting such client, or seeking appointment of an appropriate
guardian. 96 In addition, Rule 1.14(c) impliedly authorizes the lawyer,
via Rule 1.6(a), to reveal confidential information regarding the representation of the client while in the course of taking protective action,
97
to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client's interests.
10.

Duties to Prospective Clients

The final rule within Article 1 of the Nebraska Rules sets forth the
duties to prospective clients. 98 In addition to prohibiting the lawyer
from revealing information learned during the consultation, it states
that a lawyer may not represent a client with interests materially adverse to those of a prospective client in the same or substantially related matter if the lawyer received information from the prospective
client that could be significantly harmful to that person in the matter. 99 In the event of such disqualification, the conflict is imputed to
94. Id. at R. 1.13(b).
95. Id. at R. 1.14. Determining what exactly constitutes diminished capacity is a
significant problem which may not be resolved with reference to the terminology
section, or, as of yet, definitive case law. See Gallagher & Kearney, supra note
14, at 611.
96. Despite this alleviation of the traditional client-lawyer relationship conception,
the primary consideration in taking any such action is still rooted in a determination of the client's best interest. See Gallagher & Kearney, supra note 14, at 602.
97. This represents another situation in which inter-dependant structure of the new
system plays a significant role in the substantive duties reflected in the new
rules, though in this case it operates to broaden the lawyer's discretion under the
rules, not to impose satellite liability. Permissive disclosure in order to protect
the interests of clients with diminished capacity is not listed amongst the confidentiality exceptions of Rule 1.6; here, as is the case in many junctures throughout the new system, the full breadth of the ethical consideration in question can
be ascertained only after an examination of the corresponding duties elsewhere
in the code which may expand or contract the lawyer's responsibilities in a given
situation.
98. NEB. RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.18 (2005).

99. Id. at R. 1.18(c).
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all other lawyers in the firm. 0 0 This is mitigated to some degree by
Rule 1.18(d), which permits representation by the firm when the disqualified lawyer is properly screened, or when informed consent in
writing has been obtained from all parties.1O1
E.

Article 2-Counselor

The second article of the Nebraska Rules relates to the lawyer's
responsibilities while acting in the role of counselor. The new rules
offer guidance with respect to two new circumstances not explicitly
provided for in the Nebraska Code, which are set forth in Rules 2.2
and 2.3.
1.

Evaluation for Use by Third Parties

Rule 2.2 governs evaluations by the lawyer for use by third parties. l0 2 The lawyer may provide evaluations of matters affecting the
client for use by someone other than the client if the lawyer reasonably believes doing so is compatible with other aspects of the representation. When, however, such evaluation is likely to affect the client's
interests in a material and adverse matter, the lawyer must obtain
the client's informed consent prior to disseminating such information.
This provision will require particular attention with regard to a variety of business relationships, where the lawyer may be asked to
render opinions to third parties relating to their clients financial or
legal condition.
2.

Third-PartyNeutrals

Rule 2.3 relates to situations in which the lawyer is serving as a
third-party neutral, whether in the role of arbitrator, mediator, or
other such capacity. 10 3 When acting in such capacity, a lawyer is required by the rule to inform any unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing that party, and explain the difference between
the lawyer's role and responsibilities when acting as a third-party
neutral and in an advocate relationship.
The provisions of Article 2 of the Nebraska Rules offer substantially more protection for clients who have enlisted the help of a lawyer to act in the capacity of a counselor, and represent another
situation in which the rules utilize more stringent disclosure requirements as a means of ensuring the client's interests are preserved.
From the vantage point of a client unfamiliar with the ramifications of
allowing her lawyer to provide an unqualified objective assessment of
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id. at R. 1.18(d).
Id. at R. 2.2.
Id. at R. 2.3.
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her current state of affairs to third parties, or who does not understand the limits on the confidentiality privileges she is entitled to
when utilizing a lawyer's services in a mediation or arbitration capacity, the new rules favorably shift the burden of these consideration
onto the shoulders of the lawyer.1 0 4 This approach seems indicative of
an underlying policy of the new rules to require the lawyer, through
disclosure and consent requirements, to take the necessary steps to
protect the client's rights and interests in recognition of the fact that
the inexperience or incapacity of the client may render her unable or
ill-prepared to recognize the consequences of her decisions regarding
the course of their legal representation.
F.

Article 3-Advocate

The Nebraska Rules set forth the responsibilities of a lawyer acting
in the role of an advocate in Article 3. Few of the principle requirements in the new rules regarding the lawyer's role as an advocate are
significantly modified from their form in the Nebraska Code, with the
exception of the same expansion and extended clarification of the former system's broad all-encompassing provisions, as has been the case
with the previously discussed rules.
Perhaps the most significant deviations of the rules governing the
advocate relationship in the new system are found in Rule 3.3's requirements governing candor toward the tribunal.' 0 5 Both the new
and former rule systems prohibit the lawyer from knowingly allowing
the client to perjure herself before a tribunal, or offering evidence or
statements the lawyer knows to be false; the difference emerges in the
respective provisions governing what steps must be taken in the event
such testimony or falsehood has taken place. Disciplinary Rule 7102(B) of the Nebraska Code required that the lawyer reveal frauds
perpetrated by the client in the course of the representation, unless
such information was protected as a privileged communication.O6
Under the Nebraska Rules, the lawyer has a duty to remedy such situation despite applicable confidentiality protection, as Rule 3.3(c) explicitly provides that the duties regarding candor towards the tribunal
apply even if compliance requires disclosure of communication which
104. The Code of ProfessionalResponsibility endured frequent criticism for being directed primarily towards the lawyer acting in the capacity of a litigator; the
Model Rules have, through these provisions, attempted to fill this perceived void
by extending regulatory coverage to the additional capacities in which lawyers
may operate, thereby ensuring the protection of client interests in these situations enjoy the same protections as would those of a client involved in a litigation
scenario. Sisk, supra note 6, at 288.
105.

NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2005).

106. NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B) (2000).
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would otherwise be protected by Rule 1.6.107 While there would be
some situations in which the crime exception of Rule 1.6 would have
made disclosure permissible, the disclosure requirement under Rule
3.3 states such as an affirmative duty to disclose, as opposed to the
"may" language utilized in Rule 1.6.
The merits of such a change invite considerable debate. On one
hand, placing the burden of correcting the client's malfeasance
squarely upon the lawyer's shoulders would seem to be at odds with
the concept of dedicated and zealous representation, and may serve to
undermine the represented party's trust in her legal counsel. Conversely, the only lawyers who would potentially be subject to sanction
as a result of this change are those who choose to place an unbridled
pursuit of the client's objectives ahead of the interests of the public,
third parties, and the integrity of the justice system at any cost. By
utilizing the mandatory standard, the Nebraska Supreme Court has
indicated a reluctance to allow the public interest to be cast aside in
order to preserve the lawyer's ability to abstain from reporting perjury
on the part of her client.
G.

Article 4-Transactions with Persons Other Than Clients

As was the case with the preceding article, the rules governing
transactions with those other than clients, as set forth in Article 4,
have not undergone significant substantive alterations from their
comparative Nebraska Code provisions. The primary change of which
Nebraska lawyers should take note is found in Rule 4.4, which sets
forth duties relating to respecting the rights of third persons. los The
new rule mandates that a lawyer who receives a document relating to
the representation of her client, and knows or reasonably should know
that such document was inadvertently sent, shall promptly notify the
sender.109 Curiously, the rule does not broach the subject of whether
or not the lawyer may read further information from the document
than is necessary to ascertain its mistaken delivery; these considerations would presumably be matters within the scope of the lawyer's
professional judgment as per Rule 1.2.110
107. This situation mirrors that present with regard to the Rule 1.14 provisions governing clients with diminished capacity; for an analysis of the structural implications involved, see supra subsection II.D.10. Nebraska's approach regarding the
candor toward the tribunal requirement being excepted from compliance with
confidentiality requirements is not universal; in Washington, for example, Rule
3.3 does not permit disclosure of information protected by Rule 1.6. WASH. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) (2005).
108. NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2005).
109. Id. at R. 4.4(b).
110. Id. at R. 4.4 cmt. 3. Other states have provided a definitive resolution of the
lawyer's responsibilities with respect to this quandary. In keeping with their
comparatively stringent obligations with respect to ethical regulations, New
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Article 5-Law Firms and Associations

Ethical considerations relating to the law firm and its associates
are set forth in Article 5. There are some provisions of the new rules
which represent an expansion or modification of the regulations found
in the Nebraska Code, including significant expansions of the rules
governing the responsibilities of subordinate and supervising lawyers.
1.

Responsibilitiesof Partners& Supervisory Lawyers

Supervising lawyers are now subject to a particularly onerous obligation under Nebraska Rule 5.1, which contains a provision holding a
lawyer accountable for another lawyer's violations of the rules in certain circumstances. 1 1 1 The rule provides that a lawyer shall be responsible for such violation if the lawyer orders or ratifies the conduct
involved, or if the lawyer acting as a partner or one who has comparable managerial authority over another lawyer fails to take reasonable
remedial action to avert such conduct at a time when its consequences
can be avoided or mitigated.112 While the former Nebraska Code did
require that lawyers report violations of the ethical rules committed
by other lawyers or be subject to discipline themselves as per Disciplinary Rule 1-103(A), they did not contain equivalent provisions creating the potential for violations resulting from a failure to mitigate or
remedy the consequences of a violation by another if they were able to
do so. 1 13 These same requirements of lawyers in supervisory positions
are rendered applicable to support personnel through the subsequent

provisions of Article

5.114

Rule 5.2, which sets forth the responsibilities of subordinate lawyers, provides a somewhat more lenient standard for lawyers in a
subordinate position regarding compliance with the ethical rules.1 1 5
The rule first states that a lawyer is still bound by the Nebraska Rules
irrespective of the lawyer acting at the direction of another person;116
the subsequent provision, however, adds an important caveat to this
principle. Rule 5.2(b), of which there was no comparable provision in
the Nebraska Code, states that a subordinate lawyer is not in violation
of the Nebraska Rules if she is acting in accordance with a supervisory
lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional

114.

Jersey provides that the lawyer who receives an inadvertently sent document
shall not read such document, or, in the event they have begun to do so, shall stop
reading and promptly notify the sender. N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b)
(2004).
NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1 (2005).
Id. at R. 5.1(c).
NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILTY DR 1-103(A) (2000).
NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2005).

115.

Id. at R. 5.2.

111.
112.

113.

116. Id. at R. 5.2(a).
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duty.117 By absolving the subordinate lawyer of some degree of responsibility under the Nebraska Rules, the concepts of Rule 5.1 involving the supervisory lawyer's responsibility to minimize harm resulting
from a subordinate lawyer's lack of compliance with the rules are further enforced.
While the aforementioned provisions do not directly involve the recurring theme of the new rules offering protectionist treatment with
regard to client interests, they do embody the similar ideal of placing
the burden of adherence to the relevant ethical objective upon the
party best situated to do so. From the perspective of the lawyer in a
managerial or partner capacity, accepting the burden of responsibility
for the ethical indiscretions of those under their supervision in certain
circumstances represents an extremely onerous duty resulting as a
byproduct of the allocation principles of the new rules, which seem to
offer great deference to the preservation of client interests, and seek to
shift the burden of the ethical obligation to those best informed as to
the ramifications of a chosen course of conduct.
2.

MultijurisdictionalPractice

The Nebraska Rules, and more specifically Rule 5.5, set forth a far
more detailed system of regulation regarding the unauthorized practice of law and multijurisdictional practice than did the former Nebraska Code.118 Most significantly, the new rules contain an
exception to situations which would otherwise constitute an unauthorized practice of law, allowing a lawyer licensed to practice in another
state to provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction.1 19 The remaining principles of Rule 5.5, while certainly more
detailed and explicit than the former version, would probably fit
within the broad provisions of Disciplinary Rule 3-101 of the Nebraska
Code, which required that the lawyer not aid a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law, or practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so would be in violation of the regulations of the profession in that
jurisdiction.12o
I.

Article 6-Public Service

The ethical considerations governing public service are located in
Article 6 of the Nebraska Rules. The new regulations under this subheading provide significantly more coverage with respect to pro-bono
117. Id. at R. 5.2(b).
118. Id. at R. 5.5. For a more in-depth analysis of the implications and application of
the Model Rule's approach to multijurisdictional practice, see Susan Poser, MultijurisdictionalPracticefor a MultijurisdictionalProfession,81 NEB. L. REV. 1379
(2003).
119. NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5(c) (2005).
120. NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-101 (2000).
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service, the acceptance of representation appointments, and participation in legal service organizations.
1.

Pro-Bono Activities

Promotion of the ideal of voluntary pro-bono public service is set
forth in Rule 6.1, which states that a lawyer should aspire to render
such legal services. 12 1 The rule subsequently elaborates upon the
manner in which the lawyer should provide such services, specifically
mentioning the delivery of free or reduced cost legal services directly
to individuals without the means to pay for such services, to non-profit
or charitable organizations who are in need of such services, or
through direct financial contribution to organizations providing free
legal services to low-income individuals.122 It should be noted that
new rule's use of the word "should" within each of these provisions
does not constitute an affirmative duty. Rather, they are suggested
duties to which an attorney seeking to fulfill the ethical considerations
of the Nebraska Rules should aspire to. Although the former Nebraska Code did not contain such admonishments stated within black
letter rules, there were similar ideals embodied within EC 2-25 and 233, which advanced the idea that lawyers should render free legal services to those who are unable to pay reasonable legal fees, and should
cooperate with qualified legal assistance organizations,

respectively. 123
2. Appointments of Representation
Rule 6.2 governs the acceptance of appointments of representation. 1 24 The primary consideration advanced by the rule is that a lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment except for good cause, and
subsequently sets forth three specific circumstances in which declining such representation is permissible.1 25 If the representation would
result in the violation of the Nebraska Rules, would result in an unreasonable financial burden for the lawyer, or involves a cause so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the lawyer's ability to
represent the client, the lawyer would presumably have good cause to
avoid such appointment. The former Nebraska Code advanced similar
ideals in EC 2-29, which stated that the lawyer should not seek to
avoid such appointments barring the existence of compelling reasons. 12 6 There is some significance in the use of the term "shall" in
Rule 6.2 with respect to not seeking the avoidance of appointment, as
121. NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2005).
122. Id. at R. 6.1(a), (b).
123.
124.

NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25, 2-33 (2000).
NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.2 (2005).

125. Id. at R. 6.2(a)-(c).
126. NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-29 (2000).
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compared to the "should not" term utilized in the Nebraska Code.
Through this provision, the Nebraska Rules place a higher level of importance on the duty to accept legal appointments, as well as providing more onerous requirements regarding the lawyer's duties with
respect to appointments.
In adopting more stringent requirements regarding the acceptance
of legal appointments, the Nebraska Rules again seek to protect the
legal rights and interests of the client, specifically, the rights of those
clients who would presumably be unable to acquire representation
without the support of court-appointment policies. In addition to
structuring the provision so as to make avoidance of appointments
more difficult, the use of the affirmative duty phrasing elevates the
obligation placed upon the lawyer, and as previously discussed, the
potential ramifications in how the courts will interpret and apply the
rules governing ethical considerations when these affirmative duties
exist will likely be skewed in favor of the client.
The final rule within Article 6, Rule 6.5, provides some exceptions
to the conflict and imputation rules for lawyers rendering services for
nonprofit and court-annexed limited legal service programs. 12 7 In order to encourage participation in these types of free legal service programs, the rule provides that the conflict rules of Rule 1.7 and Rule
1.9(a), as well as the imputation rules of Rule 1.10 operating in conjunction with the former, are inapplicable unless the lawyer knows
the representation of such client would constitute a conflict of interest,
or if the lawyer knows that another lawyer in her firm is disqualified
with respect to the applicability of Rule 1.10.128 These provisions offer substantial leeway for lawyers to participate in legal service programs without being subject to the potential economic disincentives of
having themselves or their firms conflicted out of an existing or potential representation. Such safe-harbors within the rules allow for the
furtherance of desirable public policy considerations, such as providing pro-bono legal services for the indigent, by both explicitly stating
the expectation of lawyer participation in such endeavors, and providing specific means through which lawyers may pursue such objectives
without exposing themselves to undue hardship.

127.

NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT

R. 6.5 (2005).

128. Id. at R. 6.5(a), (b). These provisions further evidence the key consideration emphasized throughout this Note, that resolution of a given ethical quandary under
the Model Rules system may not always be resolved through an analysis focusing
exclusively on the provision applicable to that specific duty; the structure of the
new system is such that the operation of provisions elsewhere in the rules will
directly impact the lawyer's obligations with regard to the original rule.
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Article 7-Information About Legal Services

The Nebraska Rules deal with communications regarding a lawyer's services in Article 7. These provisions probably reflect the fewest
changes between the version embodied in the Nebraska Code and
their present incarnation. 12 9 While the provisions relating to lawyer
and law firm advertising, as well as those dealing with communication
directed at prospective clients, have been expanded and clarified in
keeping with the structural nuances and form modifications reflected
throughout the new rules, the general principals governing these ethical considerations have not undergone significant change aside from
those necessary to accommodate new advancements in communication
methods.13o
K.

Article 8-Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession

The final article of the Nebraska Rules relates to maintaining the
integrity of the profession. The provisions contained within Article 8
set forth rules governing a broad range of ethical considerations regarding bar admission, the reporting of misconduct under the Rules of
Professional Conduct, and issues relating to the administration of
sanctions for violations of the rules.
1.

Candor

Rule 8.1 provides the general requirements governing candor during both the bar admissions process, and with respect to a disciplinary
matter. 13 1 Under these provisions, the lawyer is prohibited from
knowingly making a false statement of material fact, failing to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension the lawyer knows
has arisen, or failing to respond to a demand for information from either an admissions or disciplinary authority.132 These requirements
do not differ significantly from the bar admission provisions found in
the Nebraska Code, as reflected in Disciplinary Rule 1-101(A) and
(B).133 The new rule, however, utilizes the same candor and disclosure requirements with respect to a lawyer involved in a disciplinary
129. This comparability of the two systems in this area stems from the fact that the
Nebraska Code provision governing advertising and solicitation, NEB. CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101 (2000), was revised in the 1990's to mirror the
approach utilized in the Model Rules. Poser, supra note 10, at 1316-17.
130. One important issue which is certain to garner much discussion with regard to
these provisions is the problem resulting from web-based electronic advertising,
and how the conflicting standards adopted in various jurisdictions should be applied to this type of borderless medium. See Hill, supra note 2, at 533 (discussing
the new advertising rules and their applicability to electronic communication).
131. NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.1 (2005).
132. Id. at R. 8.1(a), (b).
133. NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-101(A), (B) (2000).
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matter. A corresponding provision relating to this duty in the Nebraska Code is located at Disciplinary Rule 1-103(B), which required a
lawyer to fully reveal knowledge or evidence concerning another lawyer upon a proper request by a tribunal or other authority empowered
to regulate the conduct of lawyers. 13 4 The combination of the aforementioned Nebraska Code provisions thus approximates the regulatory effect of Rule 8.1, and should not significantly affect the lawyer's
duties and responsibilities with respect to candor in both the admissions and disciplinary processes.
2.

Duty to Report

The duty to report professional misconduct is stated in Rule 8.3.135
The circumstances under which a lawyer is required to disclose a violation of the Nebraska Rules differ from those set forth in the former
Nebraska Code. Under the new rules, a lawyer is required to inform
the appropriate professional authority when she has knowledge that
another lawyer has committed a violation of the Nebraska Rules that
raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects. 136 The rule subsequently states that such disclosure is not required if the information is
protected by the confidentiality rules or if the information was gained
while participating in a lawyer's assistance program.137 The Nebraska Code contained a comparable provision at Disciplinary Rule 1103(A),138 which required a lawyer possessing knowledge of a violation of Disciplinary Rule 1-102 to report such knowledge to the relevant tribunal. Disciplinary Rule 1-102, in turn, set forth the actions
constituting lawyer misconduct, and specifically listed the violation of
39
a disciplinary rule as an incident of misconduct.1
In contrasting the two rules, the addition of the "honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer" qualifier in the new rule seems to require more than just a violation of the Nebraska Rules before
disclosure is required, while a violation under the Nebraska Code
would seem to be a per se trigger of the Disciplinary Rule 1-103(A)
reporting requirement. As a practical matter, there will likely be few
violations of the Nebraska Rules which would fail to raise a substan134. Id. at DR 1-103(B).
NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2005).
136. Id. at R. 8.3(a). Whether these "duty to tell" provisions represent a successful
means of identifying ethical violations in real world application is questionable.
As one commentator puts it: "Most attorneys will agree with this rule on the
surface, simultaneously knowing that they would never report a colleague. The
same rule governs not only an attorney's courtroom enemy, but also close friends
and even senior partners." Hussey, supra note 15, at 265.
135.

137.
138.

NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(b) (2005).
NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103(A) (2000).

139. Id. at DR 1-101(B).
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tial question as to the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as
a lawyer, so the effects of the newly modified reporting requirement
may prove to be negligible in real-world application.
3.

Misconduct

Closely related to the professional misconduct reporting requirements are the provisions of Rule 8.4, which set forth such misconduct
itself as giving rise to a violation.140 Of specific interest under this
rule is 8.4(a), which makes the violation, or attempted violation, of the
Nebraska Rules a separate and distinct violation. As a result of this
provision, the existence of at least one satellite violation accompanying all other violations of the NebraskaRules is virtually guaranteed.
4.

Choice of Law

The final provision of the Nebraska Rules, Rule 8.5, governs the
applicable disciplinary authority, and sets forth a choice of law provision.141 The rule first provides that a lawyer admitted to practice in
this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority in force herein,
regardless of where such conduct occurs. 14 2 If the lawyer is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction, yet offers to provide legal services
in this jurisdiction, that lawyer is held subject to the same disciplinary
authority. The rule then sets forth a choice of law provision, with the
location of the conduct being the determining factor in deciding which
rules will be in force; if the conduct occurred in connection with a matter pending before the tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which
the tribunal sits shall govern. 14 3
III.

CONCLUSION

The recently adopted Nebraska Rules of ProfessionalConduct represents a significant change in the interpretation and regulation of
many of the ethical considerations previously discussed, and signal a
structural and substantive departure from the tenets of the long
standing Nebraska Code of Professional Responsibility. Differences
between the two systems are significant in many respects, and are
largely attributable to both the interrelated structure of the new system, which will result in the accumulation of satellite violations upon
140.

NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2005).

141. Id. at R. 8.5. The goals with regard to the choice of law provisions are twofold: to
provide a bright-line rule allowing the lawyer to determine what the applicable
rules are from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; and to abstain from making a judgment
regarding which jurisdiction's rules are best formulated and applicable. David
Luban, A Friendly Amendment to Model Rule 8.5, 36 S. TEx. L. REV. 1015, 1015
(1995).
142. NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5(a) (2005).
143. Id. at R. 8.5(b).
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the violation of a seemingly independent ethical duty, as well as the
more client-oriented approach adopted in the new rules, which often
place additional burdens on the lawyer in order to protect client interests. Gaining familiarity with the greatly expanded black-letter rules
of the new system, which has resulted in a more systemic and detailed
governance of the same broad ethical mandates set forth in the Nebraska Code, will require a thorough examination by Nebraska lawyers with regard to at least those provisions arising in their day-to-day
practice; the summary contained herein merely represents an analysis
of the key junctures from which the new and the former systems diverge, and an introduction to the significant themes which underlie
and will likely influence the interpretation and application of the new
provisions contained within the Nebraska Rules of Professional
Conduct.
Joel Logsdon Wiegert

